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1 Introduction
Rights are shaped through actual struggles informed
by people’s own understandings of to what they are
justly entitled. Looking for the meaning of rights
from the perspective of those claiming them
transforms defined normative parameters of human
rights debates, questions established conceptual
categories and expands the range of claims that are
validated as rights.Drawing out these “actor-oriented
perspectives” on rights can shed new light on some
key debates that have gone on among human rights
legal practitioners and scholars such as the tensions
between universalist and cultural relativist
approaches to rights; between group rights and
individual rights; between civil and political rights,
and economic, social and cultural rights; and around
the accountability of non-state actors in upholding
rights.Bottom-up actor-orientedperspectives shaped
by specific human rights struggles question the
premises of these debates, by bringing the
perspective of actors engaged in struggles for rights
to the fore. These perspectives are at the core of a
rights-based approach to development.
This article will demonstrate how focusing on
specific struggles for rights can challenge the
parameters of these debates. Further, this article
will contextualise a rights-based approach to
development within an actor-orientated perspective
in terms of particular struggles around rights,
drawing both from accounts of these struggles and
critical responses to the debates outlined above to
point to the possibility of an actor-oriented
perspective on rights. Finally, this article will
highlight some of the implications of an actor-
oriented perspective in terms of putting rights-
based approaches into practice in development.
2 What does an “actor-oriented”
perspective mean?
By an “actor-oriented” perspective, I mean an
understanding of human rights needs and priorities
that is informed by the concrete experiences of the
particular actors involved in and who stand to gain
directly from, the struggles in question. My
understanding of an actor-oriented perspective is
drawn in part from legal literature that does not
necessarily position itself within the human rights
tradition, but which calls for an evaluation of legal
principles in terms of their concrete effects in a
social setting, rather than in terms of the conceptual
coherence of abstract principles.1 This literature
goes beyond a call for attention to context to an
emphasis on consequences for less powerful groups
and/or individuals in society. To quote one of the
authors, Joseph Singer:
When we ask ourselves whether a social or legal
practice works, we must ask ourselves, ‘works
for whom?’ Who benefits and who loses from
existing political, economic, and legal structures?
(Singer 1990: 1841)
Such an approach explicitly acknowledges the
reality of power differences and hierarchical
relationships in society and therefore points to the
need to look beyond abstract formal equality
principles to the effect of those principles in
entrenching or challenging hierarchy – from the
perspective of the subordinated (Matsuda 1990:
1768; Minow and Spelman 1990: 1650).
When people ask the question ‘works for whom?’
and translate this question into action, they change
the terms of institutionalised understandings of
rights andmake the meaning of rights real in their
own context. They use an otherwise legalistic
discourse of rights in a transformativemanner that
translates it into an effective challenge against power
inequalities. They shift the parameters of the
discourse and expand the possibilities for action.
2.1 Rights-based approaches to
development2
A rights-based approach to development, at its core,
is predicated on the principle that development
should result in empowerment of socially and
economically disadvantaged groups (Ghai 2001).
An underlying proposition is that a society that is
committed to achieving social justice must
implement social and economic rights. This seems
commonplace on the face of it, but is proved
controversial by the lack of political will inmaking
this simple idea a reality (Ghai 2001: 49).
The rights-based approach suggests an integrated
view of sustenance (economic and social rights) and
freedom(civil andpolitical rights) as complementary;
each one is necessary for the full realisation of the
other. Again, a fact that should be self-evident but
one which has been obscured by ColdWar politics
anddecades of controversy within the human rights
movement.NailaKabeer (2002) writes of this linkage
from the perspective of the purpose of rights. The
purpose of rights is to ensure “freedom of action”.
Viewed from this perspective, both freedom from
coercion (civil and political rights) and the freedom
to access material resources serve the complementary
purposes of protection and promotion of the ability
to act. None is adequate without the other. Since
the 1995 Copenhagen Declaration on Social
Development, which seeks to use the framework of
rights to achieve goals such as poverty eradication,
there has been increasing focus on rights-based
approaches to development as a means to bridge
the gap between freedom and sustenance.
The HumanDevelopment Report 2000 had as its
theme this linkage between human rights and
human development, emphasising that although
these two fields have followed separate disciplinary
paths, they share the same goals: securing freedom
for a life of dignity and expanding people’s choices
and opportunities (UNDP 2000). A rights-based
approach adds an element of accountability and
culpability; an ethical/moral dimension to
development. It therefore, demands a shift from
viewing poverty eradication as a development goal
to viewing it as a matter of social justice; as the
realisation of a right and the fulfilment of a duty.3
Within the framework of a rights-based approach
to development, non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) and bilateral programmes committed to
its implementation have come up with lists of rights
they regard as basic, which cut across the spectrum
of economic, social, cultural, civil and political
rights.4 However, systematic inquiry needs to be
conducted among these organisations to generate
answers to the question ‘how does the adoption of
a rights-based approachmake us “do development”
differently?’5 For Medha Patkar of the Narmada
BachaoAndolanmovement, for instance, a rights-
based approach will only be effective and
transformative, if it changes the starting point of
development altogether. In the context of
development projects that threaten to displace
people (such as damming the Narmada river in
India), the inquiry must begin from the rights of
the communities whose livelihood is tied to the
river, rather than from a “risk assessment” which
immediately limits the inquiry to compensation
packages. A “rights assessment” will raise the
fundamental question of the right to participate in
the very process of development planning in the
first place (see Blackburn et al., this issue).6
3 Actor-informed perspectives on
key debates in international
human rights
Focusing on four key issues that have been central
to international human rights debates, this section
demonstrates that a focus on concrete struggles
leads to a questioning of the underlying assumptions
and changes the terms of these debates.
3.1 Universality vs cultural relativism
Do human rights principles provide a universal
standard to be applied uniformly, or are they
contingent on social context? Are human rights
norms universal by virtue of a common humanity,
or is the concept of human rights inherently defined
by the specific cultural context? This debate has
characterised the post-WorldWar II human rights
movement since the enactment of its founding
document: the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR), 1948 and continues to be intense.
To summarise briefly, universalists’ arguments make
a normative claim that human rights should provide
a universal standard because rights inhere in every
human person by virtue of simply being human.
Rights flow from the inherent dignity of every human
person. Rights are not given by the sovereign and
therefore the sovereign cannot take them away.Nor
are rights pegged to social status or stratification
based on age, gender, or caste. Since rights flow from
the inherent dignity of the human person, they are
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therefore not contingent on particularities such as
political, social, economic or cultural context.
The universalist position is encoded in
international human rights documents such as the
1993 ViennaDeclaration onHumanRights, adopted
at the first UN Conference onHuman Rights. The
preamble to the Declaration states that ‘all human
rights derive from the dignity and worth inherent
in the human person’ and that the UDHR
‘constitutes a common standard of achievement for
all peoples and all nations’. The second category of
universalist arguments is the formalist argument
that since most states have ratified and agreed to
be legally bound by international human rights law,
then human rights standards are universal. In
addition, some argue, theUDHR, though simply a
declaration that is not legally binding is such a
widely accepted landmark instrument in human
rights that it has (or parts of it have) become
customary international law (Steiner and Alston
2000: 367). Customary international law refers to
norms that have evolved from state practice over
time, which bind even those states that have not
entered into specific treaties on those aspects of
international law: in this case, human rights.
Radical cultural relativist arguments are at the
other end of the spectrum from normative and
formalist universalist arguments.The radical cultural
relativist arguments hold that there can be no
transcendent idea of rights. Radical cultural
relativism views culture as ‘the sole source of the
validity of amoral right or rule’ (Wilson 1997: 2).
Therefore international human rights norms reflect
a particular cultural viewpoint, a Western one. A
good example of radical cultural relativism is the
statement that the American Anthropological
Association (AAA) issued in reaction to the draft
UDHR in 1947.TheAAA cast doubt on theUDHR’s
claim to represent a universal perspective. It stated:
How can the proposedDeclaration be applicable
to all human beings and not be a statement of
rights conceived only in terms of the values
prevalent in the countries of Western Europe
and America? … Standards and values are
relative to the culture from which they derive
so that any attempt to formulate postulates that
grow out of the beliefs or moral codes of one
culture must to that extent detract from the
applicability of any Declaration ofHumanRights
to mankind as a whole. (AAA 1947: 539)
Examples of features that the AAA regarded as
being of a typically Western worldview are the
centrality of the individual as opposed to the
community (discussed below) and the emphasis
on rights as opposed to duties.
In the arena of state practice of international law,
cultural relativism is expressed in the reservations
that various states havemade to some human rights
instruments. The UN Convention on the
Elimination ofAll Forms ofDiscriminationAgainst
Women (CEDAW) registers the highest number of
reservations,most of which relate to the provisions
that stipulate equality in family relations and state
obligation to reform customs and practices that
discriminate against women.7 The phrasing of the
reservations show clearly that the states concerned
see these provisions as inherently contradictory to
their cultural and or religious values. For example,
Bangladesh, Tunisia, Libya and other Muslim
countries cite conflicts with Islamic law as the reason
for their reservations, and give no indication that
this situation could change to permit withdrawal
of the reservations any time in the future.
Actor-informed perspectives that question
the terms of the universality-vs-cultural
relativism debate
Mahmood Mamdani challenges the assumptions
underlying the debate on universality (specifically
the debate on whether rights are of aWestern origin)
by arguing that rights are defined by struggle and
rights struggles are born of experiences of
deprivation and oppression.
Without the experience of sickness, there can
be no idea of health. And without the fact of
oppression, there can be no practice of resistance
and no notion of rights …Wherever there was
(and is) oppression – and Europe had no
monopoly over oppression in history – there
must come into being a conception of rights.
(Mamdani 1989: 1–2)
Viewed from this perspective, human rights are
both universal and particular: universal because
the experience of resistance to oppression is shared
among subjugated groups the world over, but also
particular because resistance is shaped in response
to the peculiarities of the relevant social context.
The extreme positions in the universalist-vs-
cultural relativist have also been criticised for
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obscuring manifestations of local understandings
of rights, “vernacularisation” of rights, in the words
of Sally Engle Merry (Merry 1997). She uses
ethnographic data drawn fromHawaiian struggles
for independence to show that even though the
discourse of human rights is based on “Western
liberal-legalist ideas”, when specific struggles in
non-Western societies utilise the discourse in
framing their demands, the concept is reinterpreted
and transformed. This transformation is a two-way
process of incorporation of local understandings
and the addition of global discourses, and it is this
two-way process that she refers to as “legal
vernacularisation”.
A similar challenge has come from accounts that
undertake a situated analysis of how people actually
live in a context of legal and cultural pluralism8 and
strategically draw from both their cultural or
religious norms and formal rights regimes in dealing
with real life situations. Both cultural norms and
formal rights regimes provide opportunities and
challenges in dealing with specific situations. The
lines are not so clear cut in reality, which rules out
a clear cut demarcation placing the blame for human
rights violations on culture and positing universal
human rights principles embodied in formal laws
as the solution (Nyamu 2000; Nhlapo 1995; WLSA
1995).
3.2 Individual or group rights?
One of the arguments made in the AAA statement
of 1947 and other radical cultural relativist critiques
is that human rights discourse downplays the
importance of community. It therefore seeks to
impose an individualist model of rights that is at
odds with non-Western ways of life. This same
emphasis is present in the constitutions of countries
that have adopted the liberal state framework. Is
there space for group-based claims in the liberal
individualist formulation of rights?Conversely, how
are individual liberties to be protected in the context
of group rights? These questions have been the
subject of debate in the broader conversation
between liberals and communitarians. The former
conceptualise people/citizens as self-interested
autonomous individuals while the latter view
individual identity as being defined through
relations with others and embedded in community.
A good summary of the various arguments in this
broader debate is contained in Mulhall and Swift
(1992), so I will not go into detail here. In addition,
Jones and Gaventa (2002) address the liberal-
communitarian debate briefly in discussing the
various conceptions of citizenship.
There are some international human rights
documents that embody human rights whose
holders are groups as well as individuals. An early
example is the 1948Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The
1981AfricanCharter onHuman and Peoples’Rights
designates some rights as individual (dignity,
recognition of legal status as aperson, right to receive
information, freedomof association andmovement,
right to work, etc.), and others as “peoples’” rights.
Peoples’ rights include the right to existence and
self-determination, right to economic, social and
cultural development, and the right to a general
satisfactory environment favourable to their
development.
Perspectives that challenge the antagonistic
view of individual and community rights
One struggle that has changed the terms of the
debate on individual and collective rights is the
struggle for the rights of indigenous peoples. In the
early stages of its engagement with the international
human rights arena, the struggle had to overcome
immense ideological opposition (mainly from the
USA andAustralia) to the use of the term “peoples”
(plural) in the draft UN Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples (1994). The plural form –
“peoples”, suggests group rights as opposed to the
rights of aggregated individuals. The declaration is
still being discussed by aWorkingGroup of theUN
Sub-commission on the Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights.
Like the African Charter, it incorporates both
rights regarded as belonging individually tomembers
of indigenous communities (e.g. nationality, life,
physical andmental integrity, liberty, security) and
rights regarded as collective (e.g. right to live freely
as distinct peoples). Some rights are phrased as both
individual and collective. These include freedom
from genocide and other forms of violence (such as
the removal of children from their homes),
deprivation of cultural values and identities, imposed
assimilation and dispossession of their lands.
New developments havemade it quite clear that
there are some rights claims that can only be
conceived of in collective terms. For instance, in
arguing for compensation to indigenous
communities for use of their knowledge in
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medicine, developing new plant varieties, or films
and other forms of art based on oral traditions, it
would be impossible to ascribe ownership to
particular individuals. These claims have been
framed in terms of packages or programmes that
benefit the community as a collective (Posey 1990).
Thus, collective action by indigenous communities
around these emerging issues calls into question
the rigid distinction between individual and
community in thinking about human rights.
In addition to the movement for indigenous
peoples’ rights, there have been other calls for a
conception of rights that does not treat collective
rights, such as the claims of family and kinship
groups, as inherently antagonistic to individual
rights.Contrary to the dominant tendency in liberal
human rights discourse, which is to present state-
citizen relations in abstracted individualist terms,
people are constantly negotiating between an
internal moral system (shaped by factors such as
culture and religion, and represented by institutions
such as kinship) and the formal legal regime of the
liberal state (Khare 1998: 199). Far from subsuming
individual concerns under community interests,
“situated analyses of rights” point to people’s own
experience of these concerns and interests as
overlapping and intertwined, sometimes in
harmony and sometimes in tension.
One example is drawn fromKhare’s ethnographic
work among “untouchable” women in a Lucknow
neighbourhood in India (Khare 1998).9 These
women’s perception of primary or fundamental
rights integrated a vision for the individual and the
community.They spoke of themost important right
as the “right to survive”, which consists of access
to ‘food, clothing, housing, education, and secure
life, but not at the expense of [their] personal and
community honour’ (Khare 1998: 200). Concern
about personal insult went hand in hand with
concern about humiliation of their parents and
husbands, as did concern for physical violence,
including violence committed by those sameparents
and husbands (Khare 1998: 201, 212). This latter
concern points to the reality of simultaneous
harmony and tension between individual and group
rights. This is the lived reality.
Khare’s account of the experiences of
untouchable women reveals amore general point
on the relationship between individual and group
rights. When status as a member of a particular
group (e.g. low caste) is so central to how one is
defined and treated in a particular social context,
it leaves little room to speak of such an individual’s
rights without addressing the broader issue of the
group’s status as a rights-holding community.
Adopting the perspective of people situated
within the reality of this complex web of
relationships regulated primarily by social norms
changes not only the way we think about human
rights, but the way we “do” human rights. This has
certainly been the case for activists engaged in
community-based human rights work withMuslim
women, and for advocates of Islamic family law
reform.A group of women’s human rights activists
from various Islamic backgrounds have developed
a Manual for Women’s Human Rights Education in
Muslim Societies (Afkhami and Vaziri 1996). The
manual covers a broad range of “rights situations”
such as rights within the family, autonomy in family-
planning decisions, rights to education and
employment, and rights to political participation.
What makes themanual different from conventional
human rights education manuals is that its
interactive and interpretive exercises interweave
excerpts from international human rights
agreements with verses from the Qur’an, shari’a
rules, stories, idioms and personal experiences.
Taking as an example the session on women’s
rights and responsibilities within the family: the
session begins with an exercise whereby participants
give their views on where rights come from, which
opens a discussion on the family as a source of
rights, and/or what role the family plays in
protecting or denying rights. Then follows an
exercise on “talking to the men in your family”,
which teases out differences and similarities in the
way various women in the group relate with their
male family members.An exercise on “negotiating
your rights and responsibilities within your family”
focuses on a woman’s freedom to choose whom and
when to marry. The exercise is facilitated through
the story of a woman named Leila, her father and
theman to whom she has been betrothed. A series
of questions based on the scenario culminate in a
reflection on two verses from theQur’an and article
16(2) of theUniversalDeclaration ofHumanRights
(UDHR),10which invites the participants’ comments
on what aspects of their cultural and religious
experience support women’s rights within the family
(Afkhami and Vaziri 1996: 5–9).
Recognition of the reality of community and of
plural moral orders also forces us to think more
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broadly about sites for human rights engagement
and come up with more innovative strategies. For
instance, access to formal types of remedies under
statutes and constitutional bills of rights may be
placed beyond the reach of weaker social groups
due to factors such as cost, bias or perception of
the formal system as far removed frompeople’s day-
to-day lives. In addition, the social cost of pursuing
formal remedies may be prohibitive, as in the case
of a widow deprived of access to inheritance by her
in-laws. She knows that she has legal standing to
apply for the necessary letters to administer the
estate, and that she has legal rights to the property
as a widow, which she could enforce in court. But
it is also in her interest and that of her children to
maintain good relations with her in-laws, and this
restrains her from taking legal action.
Scenarios such as these have led to activist
strategies and scholarship that engage with the
norms that sustain and regulate these relationships
(such as kinship) “on their own terms”. This
engagement with community norms (also referred
to as customary law) has prompted attention to
micro-level forums, such as intra-family and
community-based dispute-resolution processes
and made them sites for human rights struggles.
These forums play a key role in enabling or
constraining people’s ability to claim whatever rights
are available to them under custom, national laws
or international human rights principles (Griffiths
1997 and 2001; Nyamu 2000 and 2002; Hellum
1999; Hirsch 1998; Stewart 1998).
The strategies adopted or proposed by activists
and scholars engaging with these customary fora
include:
n enforcing obligations recognised under the
relevant customary law or community norms;
n gathering empirical evidence of flexibility and
variation in customary practice and its
responsiveness to changing social circumstances,
in order to challenge rigid, hierarchical and
ahistorical assertions of custom;
n invoking general ideas of justice and fairness
within a community; and
n challenging the disingenuous use of custom to
preserve inequitable social arrangements.
The challenge is to craft a legal framework of
rights and citizenship that adjudicates fairly in the
complex reality of harmony and tension between
individual and group claims. One that does not
disregard the community context in which people
are embedded, but at the same time does not
legitimise a narrow definition of personhood that
is based on status in hierarchical social
relationships.11 The latter would thereby deny the
very agency that rights and citizenship should
enable (Kabeer 2002: 20).
3.3 Indivisibility of rights: hierarchy between
civil-political and economic-social rights
In practice, people obviously do not experience
rights or their deprivation in a bifurcated manner,
distinguishing between rights of a civil-political
nature and rights of an economic-social nature. In
an organised protest in 1987, street vendors in
Ahmedabad, Gujarat, expressed their struggle as
being about “dignity and daily bread”. Police
harassment, irregular allocation of trading spaces,
city laws enacted without public participation,
uneven distribution of resource among
neighbourhoods were all integrated (IHRIP and
Asian Forum for Human Rights andDevelopment
2000: v; Rowbotham andMitter 1994).
The founding document of international human
rights, the UDHR, makes no distinction between
rights of a civil-political nature (e.g. fair trial,
freedomofmovement, association, expression) and
rights of an economic-social nature (e.g. adequate
standard of living, right to work). It provides for
rights in both categories. The debate on hierarchy
between civil and political rights on the one hand,
and economic, social and cultural rights on the
other originated in the post-UDHR attempt to draw
up a single binding charter of rights, and became
a defining feature of the international human rights
discourse throughout theColdWar era.The conflict
resulted in the enactment of two separate human
rights covenants: the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1966.
On the one hand, the Soviet Union and states
allied to it argued for the primacy of economic and
social rights. Civil and political rights such as the
freedom of speech would have no meaning for
people lacking in basic necessities such as food and
shelter. They dismissed civil and political rights as
Western ideology that had no relevance to societies
with different political structures.
Western European and North American states
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and their allies on the other hand, viewed civil and
political rights as the only rights of a truly “legal”
nature, as opposed to economic and social demands
which were not justiciable (i.e. could not be enforced
in court against the state) (Steiner andAlston 2000:
237). According to this position, the recognition
of economic and social claims as rights would
obscure the philosophical coherence of human
rights.
Some recent academic accounts still continue
to contest the “rights status” of economic and social
concerns and their relevance to discussions on
citizenship rights.The exclusion of “so-called social
rights” from a study on the link between social
movement activities and the enjoyment of
citizenship rights was explained as follows:
Whatever the virtues of these rights (and there
are many), they do not qualify as integral to the
discourse of rights, and therefore cannot serve
the purposes of a comparative study of
citizenship. (Foweraker and Landman 1997: 14)
The authors go on to argue that while civil and
political rights are universal and amenable to formal
expression in the rule of law, “social rights” are:
fiscally constricted and require distributional
decisions [and therefore] they are best described
not as equal and universal rights but as
“conditional opportunities” [more realizable in
the developed welfare capitalist states].
(Foweraker and Landman 1997: 15)
All rights require the allocation of resources,
including civil and political rights that are presumed
in this quote to be free of distributional
consequences. For instance, guaranteeing the right
to a free trial and the right to vote require resources,
as do rights to health and education.
There have been some significant attempts to
institutionalise the idea that all human rights are
interlinked; that rights guaranteeing political
freedom and civil liberties are dependent on rights
guaranteeing sustenance or economic and social
development and vice versa. One example is the
1986 UNDeclaration on theRight toDevelopment.
The declaration recognises that development is a
comprehensive economic, social, cultural and
political process, whose purpose is the improvement
of the well-being of all individuals on the basis of
meaningful participation and fair distribution of
the benefits of development.
By the time of the UN Conference on Human
Rights held Vienna in 1993, the idea of
interdependence of rights was being popularised
increasingly in the post-Cold War human rights
circles. Paragraph 5 of the 1993 Vienna Declaration
states that ‘[A]ll human rights are universal,
indivisible, interdependent and interrelated’ and
calls on the international community to treat all
rights fairly and equally, on the same footing and
with the same emphasis.
Citizenship must be an active condition of
struggling to make rights real. (Phillips 1991)
The discussion so far bears witness to the
relevance of this statement. Specific social
movement struggles at particular times have been
crucial in moving the discourse and practice of
human rights beyond the impasse of conventional
debates, and shaping actor-oriented perspectives.
These struggles have transformed the defined
normative parameters of human rights, questioned
established categories, expanded the range of claims
that could be characterised as rights and in some
cases altered institutional structures.12 The insights
arising from these social movements cut across all
of the debates discussed above. Indigenous peoples’
struggles have transformed approaches to group
rights as well as broadened the arena of rights to
cover issues of ownership of knowledge and amore
robust interpretation of the right to a healthy
environment. Communities’ challenges to
multinational corporations continue to expand
spaces for holding powerful non-state actors
accountable, both through formal legal processes
(such as public interest law suits) and informal non-
bindingmeasures such as codes of conduct, “citizen
juries” and street protests. Demands for “dignity
and daily bread” reject the compartmentalisation
of rights into the political and economic spheres.
Rights claims in a rapidly changing world continue
to expand the rubric of rights to cover new concerns
such as knowledge rights.
4 Conclusion
The final section highlights some of the key
emerging implications for taking an actor-orientated
approach to rights in practice, particularly in the
context of development research and practice.
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4.1 Situated citizenship
First, there is need to incorporate pluralistic
approaches to citizenship and rights, which capture
the everyday experiences of citizenship as mediated
by factors such as gender, ethnicity, caste and
kinship structure. Such a holistic analysis of
citizenship and rights highlights how these
expressions of diverse and overlapping identities
function simultaneously as forces of inclusion and
exclusion (Kabeer 2002).
The discussion on universality and cultural
relativism, as well as the debate on harmony and
tension between individual and group rights provide
a departure point for thinking about how “situated
citizenship”, like actor-orientated rights, can change
the parameters of debate. While paying attention
to the particular, as defined by gender, ethnicity,
religion, etc., we should not lose sight of the
relevance of formal citizenship and how themutual
interaction between “situated” and formal
citizenship enables or constrains agency. It is crucial
to ask, for instance, how formal state law (public)
has validated and reinforced structures of inequality
that have come to be viewed largely as resulting
from or being dictated by (private) custom or
religion.
4.2 Non-hierarchical but interdependent
rights
The lesson from this debate is to guard against a
dichotomous andhierarchical model of rights, while
at the same time being attentive to the reality that
at times the realisation of one right is contingent
on the existence of another. Some researchers in
the IDS-based Development Research Centre on
Citizenship, Participation andAccountability have
already encountered this reality in their work. For
instance, research by the Society for Participatory
Research in Asia (PRIA-India) among nomadic
communities in Rajasthan set out to explore their
understandings of citizenship so as to work (in
conjunction with a local NGO) toward enabling
their participation in local governance.
It soon became clear that the right to participate
in the Panchayat (local government) was tied to
residence; accessing the benefits guaranteed to them
as tribal people depended on possession of the
official ration card, which too requires one to have
a fixed address. Being nomadic they are perceived
as having no fixed residence, and therefore they
have neither ration card nor representation in local
governance structures. The NGO is therefore
undertaking a campaign for land as the priority
right that establishes the basis for other rights
claims.13
Using rights-based approaches in practice
requires asking open questions about how people
articulate rights claims in specific situations, rather
than focusing on which types of rights are important
and how they reinforce or weaken each other. The
open question is more likely to bring out the
complex overlap between demands for rights as
“things” and demands for the power to make
decisions concerning the “things” (participation).
4.3 Conceptualising accountability for
human rights
In order for rights to translate into reality, a
broadened understanding of human rights
accountability that goes beyond state structures to
broader engagement with private sector institutions
and civil society organisations is necessary. Practices
seeking to expand the accountability of non-state
actors have explored options beyond conventional
legal channels (Garvey andNewell 2004). Some of
the options, such as citizen juries and civil society
participation in the design and verification of
corporate codes of conduct exist on or outside the
margins of legal obligation, but play an important
role where few legal avenues exist. What
implications do such tools have for a politicised
conception of rights that offers a real challenge to
power?How do we ensure that they do not simply
become avenues for voice that do not translate into
any real influence?
This article has explored how recasting rights
through actual struggles can shed new light on
existing debates about rights. An actor-orientated
perspective on rights-based approaches privileges
the experiences of poor and marginalised groups
and their own understandings of rights, but without
denying the importance of formal sources of rights.
The approach enables the pushing of theboundaries
of formal legality when this is necessary for justice.
It also highlights the importance of amore situated
approach to citizenship, where rights are
interdependent, and where a range of accountability
mechanisms function to hold institutions
responsible.While an actor-orientated perspective
on rights-based approaches exposes the complexities
of using rights in practice, it also holds greater
possibilities for leading to positive change.
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* This article is adapted and abridged from Nyamu-
Musembi (2002), ‘Towards an actor-orientated perspective
on rights’, IDSWorking Paper 169, Brighton: Institute of
Development Studies.
1. See, e.g. scholarly work in the “critical pragmatic”
framework: Joseph Singer, ‘Property and coercion in
federal Indian law: the conflict between critical and
complacent pragmatism’; Margaret Radin, ‘The pragmatist
and the feminist’; MariMatsuda, ‘Pragmatism modified
and the false consciousness problem’; MarthaMinow and
Elizabeth Spelman, ‘In context’ – all in SouthernCalifornia
Law Review (1990).
2. For a discussion of the historical context and various
institutions’ perspectives on rights-based approaches to
development, see Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi, this
issue.
3. Amartya Sen’s work has been influential inmaking a link
between “development” and “freedom” and his views
influenced the conceptual premise of the Human
Development Report 2000 (Sen 1994; 1999).
4. See, e.g. Caroline Moser and Andy Norton (2001), To
ClaimOur Rights.Moser andNorton develop a functional
classification of rights into three categories: rights
necessary for survival and dignified living (e.g. life, social
protection, work,privacy); rights and freedoms for human
dignity, creativity and intellectual and spiritual
development (e.g. education, expression, association,
political participation); and rights necessary for liberty
and physical security (e.g. physical integrity, freedom
from torture, freedom from arbitrary arrest, freedom from
slavery).The rights listed in each category fall both within
civil and political and economic, social and cultural rights.
Development NGOs such as Oxfam andActionAid have
participated in the drawing up of a charter of ten basic
rights, which integrate political and socio-economic
rights.
5. This inquiry is the subject of the Institute ofDevelopment
Studies (IDS) Participation Group project on ‘Linking
Rights and Participation’, some of which is reported in
this issue of the IDS Bulletin (Miller et al. pages 31 and 52;
Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi; Musyoki and Nyamu-
Musembi).
6. Medha Patkar, ‘Mobilising for social justice’, seminar
presentation at IDS, Sussex, 16 May 2002.
7. CEDAW articles 2(f), 5(a) (calling on states to reform
customs, practices and stereotypes that reinforce women’s
inferior status) and 16 (which calls upon states to take
legal and other measures to ensure equality in family
relations).
8. Most post-colonial societies are characterised by “classic”
legal pluralism, which refers to the co-existence of formal
laws derived from the colonial encounter with theWest,
and laws based on custom and religion, which have been
incorporated into the legal system (Merry 1988; Griffiths
1986).
9. Ethnographicmethod is particularly useful in unearthing
“actor perspectives” because it ‘exposes us to people’s
changing moral-jural reasoning while dealing with
situations in real life’ (Khare 1998: 199).
10.Article 16(2) of theUDHR guarantees the right tomarry
and equal rights between men and women in marriage.
11. States whose constitutions bar people from challenging
discrimination suffered on account of the application of
religious or customary family law (e.g. Kenya, Zambia
and Zimbabwe) are examples of legal frameworks that
fail to adjudicate fairly in instances of tension between
individual and community interests. Examples of legal
frameworks that try to do so fairly include the
constitutions ofGhana,Malawi, Uganda and SouthAfrica,
which recognise the operation of religious and customary
laws subject to the fundamental rights guaranteed to all
in the constitution. For further reading on the issue of
balancing between individual rights and the recognition
of cultural or religious norms, see Nyamu (2000).
12.Resistance to the Sardar Sarovar project to dam the
Narmada river in India led to the establishment of an
Inspections Panel within the World Bank in 1993 to
oversee projects’ compliance with the Bank’s own
Operating Procedures. The panel is still operational to
date. It receives complaints from any individual or groups
who have suffered as a result of such non-compliance
and investigates them. Information on the Inspection
Panel, including up-to-date summaries of requests
received can be viewed on the bank’s website. In the
Narmada project, the Bank’s guidelines on resettlement
and rehabilitation had been disregarded in the planning
and implementation of the project (Rajagopal 2000; Fisher
1995).
13.Nandini Sen andMandakini Pant, PRIA, presentation at
meeting ofDevelopment ResearchCentre onCitizenship,
Participation and Accountability Working Group on
Meanings and Expressions ofRights, Dhaka, Bangladesh,
31 January 2002.
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